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1. Introduction. The idea of Hungarian public administration as being directed by certain facts 
of objective reality. 
 
If we should determine what the core characteristic of the ‘good state’ is, we could say that it is the 
ability to reflect on real social problems. It is a pre-question in the examination of public 
administration, positive law, the performance of public administration and the effectiveness of law 
enforcement that at what degree the state and society will provide answers for the urging questions 
of the coming years and decades. Regarding Hungary, such questions are demography problems, the 
Roma issue1 and the possible effects of climate change2. 
 
It is indubitable that in Hungary the Roma issue is one of the most urgent and in practice least handled 
problems. The latter is true also because in public spheres – including the state/public administration 
sectors of the public – it is still not well-settled which are the legitimate and constructive forms, 
frameworks and wordings of raising the issue.  
From the aspect of our topic it is another important context that the change of paradigms mentioned 
so often in relation with Roma policy shall not mean simply the numeric strengthening of the 
institutions of representative democracy today: in order to allow the Roma minority to become an 
active, initiative part of the legal community in Hungary, it is obvious that the democracy concept of 
legal-procedural stability must be overstepped, broadening its scope and content with value-based 
aspects. 
The protection of the interests of future generations – thus of the newer generation of Hungarian 
Roma people with growing significance and, based upon the demographic trend, with growing 
numbers – would require us to ‘restrict the emergence of the will of the empiric majority by referring 
to an as yet non-existing population, eventually leading us to a principle which is contrary to the 
opinion of the current majority – expressed at political elections or through the market game of supply 
and demand.’3 However, in order to operate them smoothly, the traditional principles of democratic 
representation and decision-making shall be supplemented, these new institutionalised changes 
                                                          
1  See e.g. Rixer Ádám: A roma érdekek megjelenítése a jogalkotásban. [Incorporation of Roma interests into 
legislation] Patrocinium, Budapest, 2013. 
2 See e.g. <http://www.inhungary.com/budapest/desert-in-hungary.html>accessed 5 September 2013. 
3 Lányi András: Az ökológia, mint politikai filozófia. [Ecology as political philospohy] (2012) Politikatudományi 
Szemle 21(1) 118.  
are/will be necessary.4 The constitutional ground of this concept may be that the new Fundamental 
Law stands in front of us as an ‘upward open’ constitution. This upward openness means that during 
the validity of the new Fundamental Law one of the state’s (and its organisations’) main tasks is to 
proceed during the enactment of any normative or individual regulation or during the interpretation 
of Hungary’s Fundamental Law by keeping in mind the interests of future generations.5 It will be an 
eminent task of science – at least partly – to elaborate these supplementary principles. 
 
There's a total unity within scientific literature that the strategic public policy-making must 
concentrate mainly on comprehensive advantages, instead of the sectoral ones; moreover these 
collective benefits must be sustainable, which means that any particular policy has to offer 
permanently more utilities than disadvantages.6 These are those principles in which there's a wide 
agreement among authors within the given field. 
Otherwise, from a scientific aspect, the connection between Roma organisations and central public 
administration is a poorly discovered field of research. Not only management sciences, legal science 
or political science are 'failing' concerning the given issue, but it may be also stated in general that 
several other sciences do begin to handle this topic surprisingly lately.7 
 
 
2. General features of public policy that determinate the relation of the Roma and public 
administration in Hungary 
 
A starting point of this subchapter is that new Central-Eastern-European democracies established 
after 1989 did not build the political system on layered, sophisticated consultation procedures and 
institutional systems based on wide scale social participation, but – almost exclusively – on the 
Parliament-centred formation of political structures based on the principle of representation. Many 
believe that one of the great problems of societies getting out of the control of a dictatorship is that 
due to the lack of civil society filling in the space between individuals and the state during their 
socialisation, the members of these societies could never naturally learn to incorporate the 
identification of problems, formulation of their interests, exchange their thoughts, the harmonisation 
of different opinions, without which the various problem-handling methods would not have been 
developed, either. From the public policy side it may be stated that in Hungary the legal and 
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5 See e.g. Article P) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary: 
 ‘All natural resources, especially agricultural land, forests and drinking water supplies, biodiversity – in particular 
native plant and animal species – and cultural assets shall form part of the nation’s common heritage, and the State 
and every person shall be obliged to protect, sustain and preserve them for future generations.’ 
6 See e.g.: Martin Brusis – Katarina Staronová – Radoslaw Zubek: Introduction. The Challenge of Strategic Policy 
Making. In: Martin Brusis – Katarina Staronová – Radoslaw Zubek (Eds.): Strategic Policy Making in Central and 
Eastern Europe. NISPACee, Bratislava, 2007. 9.  
7 See e.g. Prónai Csaba: A kulturális antropológiai cigánykutatások történetének összefoglaló vázlata (1951-1987). In: 
Kézdi Nagy Géza (ed.): A magyar kulturális antropológia története. Nyitott Könyvműhely, Budapest, 2008. 483.  
institutional requirements of representative democracy were fulfilled after 1990, but since then no 
material change has happened towards participative democracy; this means that Hungarian 
democracy “has frozen into” the level of representative democracy.8 
A father tendency, a feature which may be hardly separated from the one mentioned earlier is that the 
all-time state – formed after the transition – imitates, reconstructs and replaces the civil sector through 
its conscious efforts, by this making it weaker. During the analysis of this, it must not be forgotten 
that in the economic and sociological literature of the past one or two decades the state, by undertaking 
the ‘replacement’ and ‘simulation’ of the organisation of market and self-regulating social 
mechanisms and the political organisation of society, it eventually hampers the connection between 
political decision-making mechanisms and the actual fragmentation of the interests of society. 
 
It's important because – in an ideal situation – a civil-type organisation creates an institutional channel 
between the society and the state, mediating and transmitting the needs and interests of the society 
towards the state, and also forces the state to permanently legitimize itself, strengthening the openness 
and transparency of its public operation.9 
 
Until the middle or the end of the 2000s severe criticism hit the state, saying that ‘the effectiveness 
of the organisation of the state and within this, of governmental control is low due to the prolificacy 
of “background organisations” and because of the permanent intention to establish para-state pseudo-
civil organisations (public foundations, public bodies, public utility organisations)’.10 There were 
extremely many critiques related to the Foundation for the Hungarian Gypsies (Magyarországi 
Cigányokért Közalapítvány) in this context.11  
 
While in the 90's and the beginning of the 2000s the vast majority of the authors has been blaming 
the negative effects of the 'mesosphere' dominated by the state, saying that this influence makes the 
civil society weaker, nowadays most of the critiques mention the direct expansion of the state that 
takes over several public duties from other actors. 
 
Based on the main features of public policy/administrative environment it must be stated about 
Hungary that  
a) public policy has balance problems; the weight and coordination of the relevant players is 
disproportionate and incalculable due to the extreme politicisation, and political predominance 
                                                          
8 Dr. Jenei György: Adalékok az állami szerepvállalás közpolitika-elméleti hátteréről. [Supplements to the public 
policy – theoretical background of state participation] In: Hosszú Hortenzia – Gellén Márton (Eds.): Államszerep 
válság idején [State role in crisis] COMPLEX Kiadó, Budapest, 2010. 95. 
9 Jagasics Béla: A nonprofit szféra elmélete. [Theory of the nonprofit sphere] Landorhegy Alapítvány, Zalaegerszeg, 
2001. 5. 
10 Sárközy Tamás: Kormányzás, civil társadalom, jog.  [Governing, civil society, law] Kossuth Kiadó, Budapest, 2004. 
5. 
11 Government Resolution 1071/2011. (III.23.) on the elimination of the Foundation for the Hungarian Gypsies. 
characterises the relationship of the political-administrative system and society, regardless;  
b) the traditional features of Hungarian political culture are paternalism, intolerance and the 
transformation of personal relations into political ones,12  and last, but not least the presence of 
corruption phenomena, which may be observed at a degree exceeding the average of the surrounding 
area.13 
c) the final phase of public policy is missing; public policy processes begin but they often do not get 
to the end. There is no evaluation phase and closure.14 Moreover, legislative impact studies – either 
preliminary or subsequent (posterior) analyses (law-reviews) – are very rarely added to the detailed 
legal provisions. However, it is also a fact that by the time anyone could start such a subsequent 
impact study, the given legal instrument is not in effect any more...15 
 
It is also important that in Hungary ‘[the] all-time present seems to be outstanding because of the 
strong delegitimization of the all-time past, making it seem worthless, instead of focusing on its own 
achievements’.16 In this field of force even the changes of the government are of the significance of 
‘catastrophe history’.17  
Moreover, there are almost no programs that span over political courses: the very first deed of 
the new Government related to each and every sectoral policy is emphasizing that all efforts of 
the previous Government ended in failure in the las 4 or 8 years. We – in Hungary – take this 
fact as if it was normal, but it is not at all.  
Related to the presentation of roma interests within governmental decision making processes we must 
declare in advance that the most important question regarding different strategies and institutional 
systems is not necessarily the content of them (beyond some democratic requirements), but how the 
policies, the given regulations and developing – and mainly good – practices could be retained, could 
be saved. As has been mentioned earlier, the shift of the government has features of a ’catastrophy’ 
in Hungary; it is well prdeictable that the roma-strategy of the current government will be one of the 
main targets of strong attacks after the next election, trying to delegitimize the previous course (if the 
governing party or coalition changes). So, because of that the most important question today is how 
the achieved results could be preserved. The main chance, coming from the two third majority, is to 
put the substantial provisions in acts passed by a qualified majority, hardening the deregulation of 
those regulations.  
 
                                                          
12 Kulcsár Kálmán: Politika és jogszociológia. [Politics and legal sociology] Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1987. 336. 
13 http://www.ey.com/HU/hu/Newsroom/News-releases/global_fraud_survey_2010_pr > accessed 11 July 2013. 
14 Pesti Sándor: Közpolitika szöveggyűjtemény. [Public Policy Reader] Rejtjel, Budapest, 2001. 206. 
15 Fazekas Marianna: A közigazgatás tudományos vizsgálata egykor és ma. In: Fazekas Marianna (ed.): A közigazgatás 
tudományos vizsgálata egykor és ma. 80 éve jött létre a budapesti jogi karon a Magyar Közigazgatástudományi 
Intézet. [The scientific analysis of public administration in the past and today. The Institute of Hungarian Public 
Administration was established 80 years ago at the law faculty of Budapest] Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest, 2011. 38. 
16 Szigeti Péter: A magyar köztársaság jogrendszerének állapota 1989 – 2006. [State of the legal system of the 
Hungarian republic 1989–2006] Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 2008. 17. 
17 Ibid. 
 3. Levels and forums of the connection 
 
3.1. Levels of central public administration – in general 
 
Central state administrative organisations are determinative participants of public administration. 
Their significance is that their competence covers the whole country, the administrative strategic and 
operative decision-making tasks and competences are focused in their hands, and – partly due to the 
mentioned features – their activity significantly exceeds the frameworks of public administration, by 
this significantly influencing the operations of the state and society, as well as governing activities.18 
Decision-making on the structure of state administration – and within this central state administration 
– as well as about the establishment, transformation, abolition and management of certain 
organisations belong partly to the Parliament, exercising its constitution-making19 and legislative 
powers, and partly to the Government in its executive function (in governing competence).20 
 
It is very important to keep in mind that earlier there was no law characterising central state 
administrative organisations based on their type or listing them one by one. In this respect Act LVII 
of 2006 on central state administrative organisations, and on the legal status of the members of 
Government and the state secretaries (herein after referred to as: Játv. 1) has been extremely 
significant, as well as Act XLIII of 2010 (herein after referred to as Játv. 2) – replacing the former 
one under a similar name – which performed this task for the first time in Hungarian legal history. 
According to Article 1 paragraph (2) of the Játv. 2 the types of central state administration 
organisations in Hungary are the following: 
a) the Government, 
b) governmental committees, 
c) the ministries, 
d) the autonomous state administration bodies, 
e) the government agencies,21 
                                                          
18 Fábián Adrián: Közigazgatás-elmélet. [Theory of public administration] Dialóg Campus, Pécs-Budapest, 2011. 105.  
19 In the Fundamental Law of Hungary regulations directly related to central state administrative bodies may be found 
primarily in Articles 1, 15–23, 34, 45–46, 48–54, and in section 4 of the Closing and Miscellaneous provisions. 
20 Patyi András – Varga Zs. András: Általános közigazgatási jog (az Alaptörvény rendszerében). [General 
administrative law (in the system of the Fundamental Law)] Dialóg Campus, Pécs-Budapest, 2012. 279-280.  
21 Unfortunately, the word kormányhivatal – as a legal term – has two different meanings in today’s substantial law in 
Hungary: one the one hand it appears as a type of central state administration organisations (translated as government 
agency) with nationwide competence, and, on the other hand, it is the territorial (county and metropolitan) state 
administration organisation of the government with general competence (translated as metropolitan and county 
government offices). 
f) the central offices, 
g) law enforcement agencies and Military National Security Service 
h) the independent (autonomous) regulatory bodies. 
 
It is important that from the itemised listing of the types of central state administrative bodies several 
(body-type) organisations are missing which may also be part of the activities of central state 
administration: for example certain types (without the right to make decisions) are mentioned 
separately in the presently valid Játv. 2.22 
 
The most efficient categorization covering all types of organisations of central public administration 
is the level-based grouping.23 In this approach, the following may be separated well: a) the level of 
administration, where classic, daily performance of authority tasks happens (in practice the majority 
of central state administrative organisations – except for the Government and government committees 
– belong here) 24 ; b) the first level of coordination, in which the harmony of the activities of 
administrative bodies acting in specific cases is ensured, as well as the primary registration of external, 
social needs (among others, government committees belong here, as well as cabinets and other 
proposing, opinion-making and advisory bodies viewed as bodies of the Government25); c) and the 
second level of coordination, at which its exclusive member, the Government, ensures the 
‘coordination of coordination’26, and decides about the most important political and the most specific 
administrative issues. 
 
This paper highlights exclusively those stages and actors that undertake the presentation and 
reperesentation of Roma interests (or they should have done it). Accordingly, I'm not going to 
introduce the forums and participants of general consultative processes within the central 
administration [e.g. Council of the Ministers of State (államtitkári értekezlet) or Minister responsible 
for coordination of the operations of the Government (a kormányzati tevékenység összehangolásáért 
felelős miniszter27).28 
                                                          
22 See Articles 28–30 of the valid Játv. 
23 Lőrincz Lajos: A közigazgatás alapintézményei. [Basic institutions of public administration] HVG-ORAC, Budapest, 
2005. 100-106.  
24 The Office of the Prime Minister is in a very special legal and practical situation and it is closely related to all three 
aforementioned central levels: Article 36 paragraph (1) of the valid Játv.: ‘The Office of the Prime Minister is a 
working organisation of the prime minister. Unless law regulates otherwise the Office of the Prime Minister shall be 
managed upon rules relevant for ministries. (…) paragraph (5) The Office of the Prime Minister shall support the 
work of the prime minister and shall cooperate in defining the general policy of the Government.’ 
25 Before the Government makes a complicated decision, one of these bodies may examine the particular issue and take 
a proposal to the Government. See more: János Fazekas: Central Administration. In: András Patyi – Ádám Rixer 
(Eds.): Hungarian Public Administration and Administrative Law. Schenk Verlag, Passau, 2014. 293-294.  
26 Lőrincz 105.  
27 See Government Decree 52/2014. (VI. 6.) on the tasks of the Members of the Government. 
28 For details see: Fazekas János: A központi közigazgatási szervek. [Organs of central administration] In: Fazekas 
 3.2. The level of administration 
 
First of all, this level contains the ministries, the most important of which is the „human” top-ministry, 
named Ministry of Human Capacities (former Ministry of National Resources). Within the 
superstructure of it, the Deputy Minister of State responsible for social inclusion – belonging to the 
State Secreteriat for Social Affairs and Inclusion – is the representative of the Government who 
permanently and indirectly tries to reveal the interests of the Roma in Hungary, transmitting them to 
central public administration and to law-making processes. Questions and tasks related to the Roma 
(Gypsies) in Hungary evolve – directly or indirectly – also in other ministries, and mainly the 
coordinative (and partly consultative) bodies manage to interleave the unsettled efforts of different 
ministries connected with Roma. The plan for having roma rapporteurs within some of the ministries 
has come up several times, but it has not come to fruition yet, there are still no public employees 
exclusively responsible for the mentioned field according to their official scope of activities.  
 
Among the organisations – beyond ministries – belonging to the central public administration in 
Hungary we can find many of those which – according to their names, scope of duties and scope of 
authorities – do not primarily deal with revealing and presentation of Roma interests, but a huge part 
of their activities is directly connected or should be conneced to that. Such are some central offices 
[e.g.  National Office for Rehabilitation and Social Affairs (Nemzeti Rehabilitációs és Szociális 
Hivatal) or National Center for Patients's Rights, Beneficiaries' Rights, Children's Rights and 
Documentation (Országos Betegjogi, Ellátottjogi, Gyermekjogi és Dokumentációs Központ] and an 
autonomous state administration body, named Equal Treatment Authority (Egyenlő Bánásmód 
Hatóság). 
There are some further state organisations that do not belong to the executive, but the similarity of 
their activities and – acting within the scope of their activity – the high number of cases concerning 
Roma the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights (Alapvető Jogok Biztosa) and his Deputy 
Commissioner Responsible for the rights of National Minorities must be mentioned. Moreover, 
Hungary does have an Independent Police Complaints Commission (Rendészeti Panasztastület), as 
well.  
 
3.3. The first level of coordination 
 
3.3.1. The main characteristics of consultation in Hungary 
 
One of the most important pre-questions is how far civil society may go in participation in (political) 
decision making. According to the general (majority) opinion, its presence is reasonable and desired 
only in the preparation phase of decision making that manifests both informal and institutionalised 
                                                          
Marianna (ed.): Közigazgatási jog. Általános rész I. [Administrative Law. General Part I.] ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, 
Budapest, 2014. 162-163.  
forms.29 
Within the analysis of regulations related to legislation, it may be observed that the regulation – both 
in general and with regard to the Roma issue – is still very much diverse.30 Before 1 January 2011, 
there was no comprehensive act which could have attempted to provide unified regulation for the 
possibilities and procedures of the enforcement of social interests in governmental decision-making 
mechanisms.31 A unified set of regulations about social participation is still missing; even though Act 
CXXXI of 2010 on social participation in the preparation of laws ‘implies in its title that we are facing 
a unified regulation, but this is not the case. In addition to this, sets of acts and government decrees 
contain relevant regulations regarding this issue.'32 However, social participation in governmental 
decision-making mechanisms should be legally settled, just like the hierarchy of laws (the system of 
legal sources). 
 
It must also be added that ‘By today a complex system of governmental consultative bodies has been 
established in all modern public administrative systems’.33 However, despite their significance and 
quantity, the social sciences pay relatively little attention to these institutions, having a role in the 
shaping of governmental decisions, ‘[even though] a new sector has emerged, the operation of which 
is essential for the quality of governmental activities and is also important for their transparency.’34 
 
It should be noted that there is no good name for this system of organisations in Hungarian law. The 
expressions ‘background institutions’, ‘auxiliary organisations’, or ‘consultative organisations’, 
‘institutions of social dialogue’, as well as ‘proposer-review organisations’ are (may be) imprecise 
and deceptive, especially because in some cases these – very diverse – organisations possess public 
power-like competences in addition to the narrowly interpreted consultative rights. It is necessary to 
scientifically define the various types and set up a grouping of these organisations and clarify – in a 
comparative manner – their role in decision making (in the preparation of laws). And due to the lack 
of consistent legal regulation it would be important to regulate their participation in the governmental 
decision-making system (in a more detailed form), with regard to their importance. 
Based on the scope of participating organisations Vadál distinguishes between internal consultative 
bodies of governmental operation and external consultative bodies of governmental operation. 
Among the internal ones, she lists those institutions (e.g. government committees, cabinets and inter-
ministerial committees), in which only state bodies participate and the representatives of civil society 
(non-state bodies) are usually not present among the members. Among the external ones she lists 
those bodies within which, in addition to the representatives of governmental bodies, the institutions 
of the widest range of civil society are present: such as social organisations, representatives of interest 
                                                          
29 Sebestyén István: Civil dilemmák, civil kételyek a civil szervezetek (köz)életében. [Civil dilemmas, civil doubts in 
the (public) life of civil organisations] (2004) Civil Szemle 1(1) 36. 
30 Vadál Ildikó: A kormányzati döntések konzultációs mechanizmusai. [Consultative mechanisms of governmental 
decisions] Wolters Kluwer, Budapest, 2012. 170.  
31 Ibid.  
32 Ibid.  
33 Vadál 17.  
34 Ibid.  
(advocacy) groups, professional and expert organisations, representatives of science, professional 
chambers, etc.35 Within this grouping it is important that through these bodies, the interconnection 
between governmental activities and the activities of organisations interested in and concerned about 
decisions may be established. Through these bodies, the presentation of interests, their collision, 
striving for consensus, and the professional and scientific grounding of more transparent decisions 
may be realised.36 
 
The significance of consultation is also stressed by the European Commission, which published an 
announcement about consultation, supporting the notion that during consultation each of those 
concerned should be allowed to properly express their opinion.37  In most member states of the 
European Union, separate, permanent forums have been established for macro-level consultation 
which facilitate the continuous relationship between the government and social partners and other 
representatives of interests – without the burden of immediate agreements – and within this they get 
the chance to familiarise themselves with each other’s opinion.38 Beyond the narrow focus of issues 
related to the world of labour, this covers also specific policy issues. In member states, macro level 
consultations aiming at shaping the economy and social policy globally are usually hosted within the 
institutional frameworks of prestigious, dominant forums.39 Naturally, governmental-civil discussion 
should also be part of social discussion. In addition to social partners, the representatives of civil 
organisations ‘shall also be present in the work of the consultative bodies of macrolevel negotiation 
of interests’40 
Nevertheless ‘it may be stated that the prestige of consultation is much lower in Hungary than in other 
member states’41 In Hungary the consultative role is often interpreted as of lower value, failure – also 
in the self-evaluation, self-assessment of the players; as a synonym of slow marginalisation in 
substantial – macro level – policy-making. This same fact lies in the background of the fact that in 
Hungary consultation, negotiation, cooperation is basically agreement-centred, bargain-oriented.42 
We should also add that today in Hungary ‘consultation is [often] not the indicator or instrument of 
values, but of relatively quickly changing interests’. A closely related phenomenon (fact) is that while 
in most of the old member states consultation is substantial (ensured by legal guarantees) and constant, 
in Hungary – traditionally – a lower level of regulation and ‘ad hoc’ character is dominant43, a 
situation intensified by the exceptionally infrequent convening of certain forums. 
                                                          
35 Vadál 61.  
36 Ibid.  
37 Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue – General principles and minimum standards for 
consultation of interested parties by the Commission. Communication for the Commission, COM(2002) 704 final. 
38 Ladó Mária – Tóth Ferenc: A konzultáció és intézményei az Európai Unióban, tagállamaiban és Magyarországon. 
[Consultation and its institutions in the European Union, in its member states and in Hungary] OFA, Budapest, 2002. 
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39 Ibid.  
40 Bódi György, Jung Adrienn and Lakovits Elvira, Civil partnerség [Civil partnership] (KJK-KERSZÖV 2003) 190. 
41 Ladó and Tóth 193. 
42 Ibid.  
43 Ladó – Tóth 194.  
 According to Article 30 paragraph (1) of the valid act, the Government may establish other – thus in 
addition to government commissions and cabinets further – proposer, review and advisory bodies. 
According to paragraph (2) of the mentioned article, the members of bodies described in paragraph 
(1), as well as the scope of people permanently invited to the meetings of such bodies are appointed 
by the normative government decision establishing the body. Among – public power-like – rights 
which go beyond traditional consultative rights (the right to information, the right to negotiate, the 
right to make recommendations, the right to give an opinion) those shall be mentioned through which 
decision making power is divided between the public administrative body (typically the Government) 
and the consultative body.44 
 
3.3.2. Consultative bodies whose central task is the presentation of Roma interests 
 
A) Internal consultative bodies of governmental operation  
 
1. Inter-ministerial Committee for Social Inclusion and Roma Affairs (Társadalmi Felzárkózási 
és Cigányügyi Tárcaközi Bizottság) 
The Government has set up the Inter-ministerial Committee for Social Inclusion and Roma Affairs 
for the improvement of the social situation of Roma and other people living in poverty, and also for 
the coordination of the governmental operations fostering social integration. The main task of it – 
according to Point 2. of the Government Resolution 1199/2010. (IX. 29.) on the Inter-ministerial 
Committee for Social Inclusion and Roma Affairs – is the harmonization of the activities connected 
with social inclusion, and also proposal-making on the related Government planning for the financial 
sources and for the control of the usage of those sources, and supporting the coordination and 
evaluation of the execution of tasks related to the social inclusion of Roma and people living in 
poverty. 
2. Roma Affairs Council (Cigányügyi Egyeztető Tanács) 
Roma Affairs Council is to be mentioned, too. Practically, it operates as a quasi-cabinet because the 
members are the prime minister, four ministers and the ministerial commissioner in charge of roma 
affairs. The given council serves as an opinion- and proposal-making body; it was set up to coordinate 
and to monitor the execution of the policies of social inclusion and roma affairs.45  
The Roma Affairs Council owns the right to take objection to the distribution and use of financial 
sources gained by Roma programs (kifogásolási jog). 
                                                          
44 Vadál 61. and 86. In such cases the original possessor of the decision making right, who is responsible for decision 
making, cannot deliver the decision on its own, because the converting right (co-decision making right) of the 
mentioned body limits this. Naturally, in such cases the original possessor of the decision-making right cannot fully 
delegate the right to decision making or its responsibility for the decision (and the liability for its possible 
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substantial participation and unavoidable control-possibility for the representatives of the targeted groups. 
45 Government Resolution 1048/2013. (II. 12.) on Roma Affairs Council. 
 B) External consultative bodies of governmental operation  
 
1. Roma Coordination Council (ROK-T) 
 
The Roma Coordination Council was established by the Government Resolution 1102/2011. (IV. 15.) 
and it's main goal is to work out measures serving the social inclusion of Roma based on social 
partnership with several actors of Hungarian society, and also to take part in the fulfillment of these 
goals and in monitoring the results. The Roma Coordination Council is an advisory, proposal-making 
and consultative body, which is a forum for chanelling information on interests of Roma population 
into the governmental activities.  
Under the g) subparagraph of the 4. point of the Government Resolution mentioned above, the ROK-
T consists of 27 members, 6 of which are chosen by a distinct 'invitation to tender procedure'. 
 
It's obvious that the two types of consultative organisations introduced above [under A) and B)] are 
not 'homogeneous', while the latter one – formally – has to reveal, aggregate and transmit interests 
towards the decision-makers, the previous ones have to settle those interests in practice, inserting 
them into drafts of different programs or laws.  
 
3.3.3. Consultative bodies whose central task is not the presentation of Roma interests 
 
According to the legal sources that established various proposal-making, consultative and 
coordinative organisations, such as Council of Demography and Family Policy (Család- és 
Népesedéspolitikai Tanács), Council on Drug Affairs (Kábítószerügyi Tanács), National Disability 
Council (Országos Fogyatékosügyi Tanács), Caritative Council (Karitatív Tanács), Council for 
Women’s and Men’s Social Equality (Nők és Férfiak Társadalmi Egyenlősége Tanács), Council on 
the Affairs of the Elderly (Idősügyi Tanács), Vocational and Adult Education Council (Nemzeti 
Szakképzési és Felnőttképzési Tanács), National Council for Public Education Policy (Közoktatás-
politikai Tanács), National Council for Public Education (Köznevelési Érdekegyeztető Tanács), 
National Textbook Council (Nemzeti Tankönyv Tanács) or Higher Education Planning Council  
Felsőoktatás-tervezési Tanács), it must be stated that – though these bodies are closely connected 
with various aspects of the Roma issue – the institutionalised and direct mechanisms for revealing 
the interests of the Roma are completely missing from the legal regulation and from the operation of 
them.  
 
We must underline that forums of macro-level social consultation – at least formally – independent 
from the Government also exist in Hungary. The best example of the latter is the National Economic 
and Social Committee [Nemzeti Gazdasági és Társadalmi Tanács] established by Act CXIII of 2011 
on the National Economic and Social Committee, which was created with the aim of discussing 
comprehensive ideas related to economic and societal development and national strategies existing 
through governmental cycles, and facilitating the elaboration and realisation of harmonised and 
balanced economic growth and the related social models. The Committee was established as a 
consultative, proposer and advisory body independent from the Parliament and the Government, and 
as a complex and most diverse consultative forum of social dialogue between organisations 
representing employers’ and employees’ interests, economic chambers, civil organisations operating 
in the field of national policy, national and foreign representatives of science, and churches defined 
in a separate act.46 It is worth noting that the solution is not unique in Hungarian legal development.47 
It is important that independence from the Government does not mean that during the activities of the 
forums, opinions of the Government and civil organisations cannot be directly in conflict or that the 
Government cannot be substantially ‘influenced’ in some ways. It's a surprise – compared to the 
monumental goals – that organisations revealing or representing Roma interests are out of the taxation 
of the members of the National Economic and Social Committee. 
 
To sum up, according to the organisations mentioned above (within point 3.4.3.), search on the 
content of the legal instruments establishing them shows that provisions prescribing (ordering) 
selection and participation of entities directly undertaking representation of Roma interests are almost 
completely missing or are rather indirect and shallow. Point 2. of Government Resolution 1136/2011. 
(V. 2.) on measures taken to strengthen social inclusion ordered to review the regulation on 
interministerial bodies, other consultative and coordinative bodies on behalf of the National Roma 
Self-government's (Országos Roma Önkormányzat, ORÖ) involvement in decision-making and 
monitoring operations related to the measures, mentioned. Unfortunatelly, those specific rules, legal 
provisions hasn't been elaborated, yet. 
 
3.4. The second level of coordination 
 
3.4.1. General questions 
 
In relation to the Government it is necessary to make reference to the situation and significance of 
the prime minister. In the opinion of György Müller, viewing the Hungarian system from the aspect 
of the situation of the Prime Minister it may be characterised as a chancellor-type of governing, 
because the present German system and the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Bonn, 
1949) served as examples in 1990 and later, too.48 However, it should also be added that even though 
the Fundamental Law was the first to expressly state the dominant role of the Prime Minister within 
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the government,49 the primus inter pares role which may be observed in the previous Constitution, 
which trusted the Prime Minister almost exclusively with leading the body, did not reflect the actual 
situation, practical solutions in the 20 years preceding 2011, 50  which means – with some 
simplification – that the respective provisions of the Fundamental Law only expressed the situation 
which had existed for a long time. 
The majority of the decisions of the Government is not law-making type, related to the preparation 
and enactment of laws, but defines tasks or makes control over particular sectoral operations. The 
latter are prepared by ministries which are responsible for the written proposals. 51  Actually, 
participation of the Government and ministries within the law-making process is a special and twofold 
phenomenon because preparation of laws extends also to legal instruments of other governmental 
entities – beyond their own legal sources.  
 
3.4.2. Tools for coordination 
 
1. In June 2007, the Parliament approved a resolution on the Decade of Roma Inclusion 
Programme Strategic Plan (Roma Integráció Évtizede Program Stratégiai Terve), setting a 
framework for action in a series of fields where Roma experience discrimination and 
disadvantage in daily life. This resolution complemented a large number of measures that may 
serve to improve the situation of Roma in fields such as education and employment,52 and that 
have been only partly taken in the last few years. On 30 November 2011 the new Hungarian 
Government adopted a National Social Inclusion Strategy – extreme poverty, child 
poverty, the Roma - 2011-2020 (Nemzeti Társadalmi Felzárkózási Stratégia 2011-2020), 
which was sent to the European Commission by the Minister of State for Social Inclusion 
(Ministry of Public Administration and Justice). Hungary was therefore the first Member State 
to submit such a strategy. In doing so, Hungary has fulfilled the commitment made by all 
member states when they endorsed the European Framework for National Roma Integration 
Strategies. For the execution of the Strategy 1430/2011. (XII. 13.) Government Resolution 
was adopted, ordering certain specific measures. The newest strategy is the Hungarian 
National Social Inclusion Strategy II. which was adopted in the very end of 2014 by 
1603/2014. (XI. 4.) Government Resolution. 
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2. The execution of the plans and strategies mentioned above – at least partly – depends on the 
ivolvement of social partners, on long-distance relationships. A good – though as yet mainly 
theoretical – example is the Framework Agreement established between the Government of 
Hungary and the National Roma Self-Government [ORÖ], based on which ‘Within their 
cooperation the Government and the ORÖ establish a draft government decree, in which they 
define the certain fields of intervention and the participants of the co-decision agreement and 
together with the bodies appointed for codecision-making define the co-decision-making 
mechanism relevant for the given field, by taking into consideration, and keeping in line with, 
the valid EU and national procedural regulations’. In an exemplificative manner, the 
Framework Agreement defines those fields in which it wants to give to the ORÖ effective and 
substantial rights for the enforcement of interests: ‘The Government establishes the co-
decision system primarily in the fields of programs aiming at the expansion of employment, 
increasing standards of education and improving standards of living, as well as of scholarship 
programs, investment and employment supports.’  
It is clear, therefore, that the decision-making and co-decision-making rights may primarily contain 
partial rights related to tenders, funds, or personal issues, sometimes not in a substantial manner, but 
‘only’ in form of veto53 or ‘quasi veto’, the latter one covering the elements which, for example, allow 
for the postponement of decision-making or the suspension of the execution of the delivered 
decisions.54 It's obvious that substantive implementation of these tools (instruments) really requires 
political courage of the Government, as organisations obtaining rights become partly 'independent' 
and most powerful actors. 
Besides co-decision another notion is to be mentioned: co-regulation. Regarding the notion of co-
regulation, it shall be mentioned that it is a rather new ‘set of legal institutions’. It is important that 
the White Paper on European Governance published by the European Commission mentions co-
regulation as an example of better and faster regulation.55 Co-regulation – regardless of its field – 
builds on the cooperation of state, market and other players and contains a mix of legal and non-legal 
elements, focusing on the previous ones only if the latter ones alone cannot achieve the set target: co-
regulating systems are usually based on self-regulation, the results of which are continuously 
supervised, and if necessary corrected by the state.56 The main aim of co-regulation is to channel the 
activities of self-regulating organisations – usually beyond substantive law – into public power 
procedures. During co-regulation public power – normatively – sets achievable targets and self-
regulation fills these with content. Co-regulation makes it possible to transfer the goals set by the 
legislator to interest representative organisations acknowledged at the given field (‘regulated self-
regulation’), by this facilitating the channelling of self-regulatory initiatives.57  
This way of regulation is common mainly regarding different industries and service areas, but it may 
also be possible to introduce and use its set of tools in other areas. For example, in Hungary it is 
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extremely important to establish cooperation partly (co-regulation) with cultural, educational, social 
and other service provider organisations, as well as with those cooperating in the identification, 
presentation and representation of Roma (Gypsy) interests.58 However, the differentiation of the 
notions of co-regulation and co-decision seems to be unavoidable in this area. 
 
3. Within the given field a prime ministerial commissioner in charge of Roma affairs 
(cigányügyi kormánybiztos) was appointed in 2014.59 His main task is the evaluation of the 
results of the implemetation of the Framework Agreement signed by the Government and 
ORÖ in 2011, and also to make preparations and pre-arrangements for the renewal of that 
agreement, to make proposals for new goals and ways to fulfil the recommended targets 
concerning mainly housing, amployment and education. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
1) The more comprehensive regulation of consultative bodies is reasonable because the broadly 
interpreted governmental consultation goes beyond consultative bodies operating beside the 
government or ministries, and includes macro level forums independent from the governments, as 
well as territorial level mechanisms and specific bodies. 
 
In a rule of law state social participation in legislative procedures is not an optional process depending 
on the attitude and discretion of the power holder. Moreover, in a democracy, especially in one of the 
participative type, the institutionalised system of proposing and opinion making shall not only go 
through quantity changes (‘more forums, better regulation’), but also quality ones, which means that 
regarding these, normativity does not only mean the obligation to establish and create these 
institutions, but also ‘making them unavoidable’, thus ensuring their development through tools 
protected by law. 
 
A more comprehensive, deeper and well-founded regulation of consultative entities and mechanisms 
is required. We have to admit that governmental consultation is – in the broadest sense – a 
phenomenon that covers at the same time forums operating besides the Government or ministries, 
forums of macro-level social consultation – independent from the Government and also the direct and 
broad consultation with the People (in Hungary it's called 'national consultation'). 
Substantive regulation on the participation within consultative processes is fairly reasonable 
concerning the interests of Roma. Moreover, the regulation of the latter needs a form of a 
Governmental Decree (which is a fairly high level within the hierarchy of legal norms in Hungary), 
as it was decided (agreed) by the Framwork Agreement established between the Government of 
Hungary and ORÖ. 
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Creation of a complex system of co-regulation and co-decision implies several additional (subsidiary) 
social advantages, and this fact also strengthens the need for separate act regulating such questions. 
 
In the last two decades a plenty of coordinative bodies have been set up to harmonize distinct sectoral 
policies concerning the Roma (e.g. earlier Council of Roma Integration was established by 1129/2006. 
(XII. 25.) Government Resolution, working as a proposal- and opinion-making body. At the same 
time an internal consultative body, named Coordination Council for Roma Affairs, was created. Then 
Inter-ministerial Committee for Roma Affairs was set up in 1999, and Council for Roma affairs in 
2002... Unfortunatelly, neither these forums,60 nor other forums existing in the last few years have 
managed to become a substantial and stable forum for decision-making or even primary coordination. 
These bodies mainly look like the settings that were built up for the visitors' centre of Korda Studio 
(Etyek, Hungary): they look pretty, but there's nothing behind the walls... 
 
2) Related to the three (or four, if we take the ministerial commissioner into account) organs dealing 
with Roma issues within the scope of Hungarian governmental bodies several questions have arisen 
on the scope of their duties, on their membership and their relations to each other, etc.:  
 
 The relationship among the two Councils (Roma Affairs Council, Roma Coordination Council) 
and the Committee (Inter-ministerial Committee for Social Inclusion and Roma Affairs) is 
not stable enough, is hardly deducible according to the Governmental Resolutions, mainly 
because of the overlapping memberships. 
 The structure and the memberships do lack stability: the composition of all of them has 
changed since their establishment, which is an misadventurous practice, prolonged by the 
given Government. This practice is a fairly bad one, because concerning these coordinative 
organisations the stability of the operation mainly comes from substantive cooperation that 
requires unchanged list of members who really know one another.  
 The lack of separate attention given to the Roma in Hungary as a conscious public policy. 
Though the EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies 2011-2020 warns the 
mmeber states to „focus on Roma in a clear and specific way”, the Hungarian strategy tries to 
solve the problems of the pauperization, child poverty, etc. and the situation of the Roma: the 
lack of a clear focus endangers the success of the measures taken. This statement is verified 
by the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee, issued in 2013. 'The findings 
of the study commissioned by the EESC and carried out in 27 Member States are consistent 
with those carried out by the European Roma Policy Coalition (ERPC) and other civil society 
organisations, and show that apart from a lack of information and general dissatisfaction, there 
is also widespread frustration and distrust among spokespersons for the Roma community, 
civil society organisations and their representatives. It seems that the NRISs have not met the 
growing expectations of the Roma or their sincere hope that the strategies could really help 
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improve social integration.'61 
 Concerning the Roma Coordination Council (ROK-T) one of the most frequent critiques is 
that it's too large. A body which consists of 27 members must establish sub-committees, to 
become able to operate efficiently. Without sub-committees it can easily happen that the 
exclusive task of such a body is reduced to politically legitimating decisions made earlier and 
outside the body. 
 
3) There are enormously huge further opportunities in the cooperation among non-ministerial 
organisations within central administration and also between the latter and other non-executive state 
organisations. From the side of possible Roma clients and other stakeholders, we must express that 
the 'visibility' of each of these state organisations, which directly or indirectly undertake to protect 
the rights of the Roma in Hungary, is quite low. As such, the common appearance could substantially 
strengthen the visibility. We may detect the very same weakness concerning the scientific researches 
that should be managed by the same actors – together.  
There are multiple reasons behind the lack of common actions, one of which is that in Hungary 'any 
governmental body can be closed up with an other one', so the strengthening of their independence, 
their own image, their dissimilarity may become a more important angle than the interests of the 
clients...  
 
4) Transformation of the attitudes of the central administration in Hungary 
The picture wouldn't be correct without mentioning the wrong attitudes and the role of the staff of 
public administration towards the Roma. These negative attitudes are often responsible for the low 
efficiency of sevaral institutions and mechanisms presenting/reperesenting Roma interests. In public 
administration, one often thinks that performance measurement, monitoring and evaluations can solve 
problems like negative attitudes among professionals.62 This approach has proven to have serious 
negative side effects and discipline of social psychology offers alternatives to this approach. This 
discipline sees human behaviour as the result of the interaction of mental states and immediate social 
situations, and public administration can learn from theories in social psychology and the application 
thereof to organisational behaviour in the public sector.63  
Social psychology offers an alternative to the neo-institutional approach of reducing information 
assymetry, using incentives and reorganisations to improve professionalism in complex 
organisations64 Social psychology tries to restore the values, to change the attitudes for better.65 
Several researches pointed especially to the importance of the sequential, formal, serial, and 
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investiture nature of socialisation i. e. socialisation through structured career progression and 
institutionalised training programmes, as well as the provision of role models and support from 
experienced organisational members.66 As to the contents of such socialisation, understood in terms 
of 'mental programming', the number of topics to be included and the relative importance of each of 
them varies.67 Such socialisation results in clarity and congruence about what the (new) employee 
and the organisation he or she is working for can reasonably expect from one another.68  
So, the changes depend also on those programs, that do not influence directly the Roma population 
but qualify the employees (and members of certain bodies, not employed by the state) for an altered 
stance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
66 Ibid. 105. See also: Rixer 178-182.  
67 Sobis – de Vries 105.  
68 Ibid. 106.  
 Further reading: 
 
Balogh, Lídia et al.: Civil Society Monitoring Report on the Implementation of the National Roma 
Integration Strategy and Decade Action Plan in 2012 in Hungary. Decade of Roma Inclusion 
Secretariat Foundation, Budapest, 2013.  
Behind God's back: The Government, Civil Society and the Roma (Zoltán Balog talks to Nick 
Thorpe) Hungarian review 2010. (Vol. 1.) No. 1. www.hungarianreview.com/archive (10. 04. 2015.) 
Fazekas, János: Central Administration. In: András Patyi – Ádám Rixer (Eds.): Hungarian Public 
Administration and Administrative Law. Schenk Verlag, Passau, 2014. 293-294. 
Kelen A. - Visy E. - Talyigás K. - Fekete O.: A summary of the measures to promote Roma integration 
in Hungary. Acta Oeconomica 2011. (Vol. 61.) No. 3. 337-360.  
Moisă, Florin - Szenkovics Dezső: Közpolitikák a roma problémák kezelésére. [Public politics 
treating problems concerning the Roma] Magyar kisebbség 2008. (Vol. 13.) No. 3-4. 305-323. 
Pitlik László: Keretmegállapodás Magyarország Kormánya és az Országos Roma Önkormányzat 
között - hasonlóságelemzési rétegekkel. [Framework Agreement between the Government of 
Hungary and the National Roma Self-Government – a comparative study] Magyar internetes 
agrárinformatikai újság, 2011. (Vol. 14.) No. 1. 
Rixer, Ádám: Civil Society in Hungary. A Legal Perspective. Schenk Verlag, Passau, 2015. 
Rixer Ádám: A roma érdekek megjelenítése a jogalkotásban. [Presentation of Roma interests in 
legislation] Patrocinium, Budapest, 2013. 
Rixer Ádám: Egy új társadalmi szerződés körvonalai a roma kérdés ürügyén. [Contour of a new social 
contract according with the Roma issue] De iurisprudentia et iure publico 2009. (Vol. 3.) No. 3-4. 68-
76.  
Rózs László: Gypsies and Public Opinion. The New Hungarian Quarterly, 1979. (Vol. 20.) No. 1.  
126-130. 
Szuhay Péter: The Plight of Hungary's Roma. The Hungarian Quarterly 2011. (Vol. 52.) No. 6. 86-
102.  
Vekerdi József: The Gypsies and the Gypsy Problem in Hungary. Hungarian Studies Review 1988. 
(Vol. 15.) No. 2  13-27. 
 
 
 
